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The Relationship Between Property
Rights and Civil Rights
By RICHARD R. B. POWELL
LAW has, as a major function, the lubrication of the mechanisms of
society. It is its task to afford people, in the accelerated closeness of
modern living, a society in which they are able to live together harmoni-
ously and with mutual advantage. On this approach it is not far-fetched
to say that the most important internal problem of the United States in
1963 is the treatment of its minorities. This problem has generated more
heat, more human hostility, more evidence of the need for better lubri-
cation than any other single aspect of current society. Can "law" do a
better job? If so, how? It is always easier to tell other people, living at
a distance, how they can improve their behavior and their law. But,
perhaps, it is more profitable to start with the behavior and the law in
the community wherein we sleep.
I shall begin by sketching the current context of conflict, paying
attention first and foremost to the State of California, but not neglecting
the national aspects of these questions which are comparable to our local
worries. There are five separate situations which deserve attention.
About a year ago the City Council of Berkeley adopted a so-called
Fair Housing Law, to supplement the Hawkins and Unruh Acts of 1959.'
A petition for a referendum resulted in a vote on this statute in the
Spring of 1963. One of the arguments advanced against the ordinance
was that in prohibiting persons from refusing to sell or to rent to negroes,
the "property rights" of landowners would be unlawfully destroyed. The
voters of Berkeley killed the ordinance by a vote of about 23,000 to
21,000. For the city of Berkeley, "property rights" were. thus shielded
from the threat of "civil rights."
Secondly, when the Board of Directors of the National Association
of Real Estate Boards met in Chicago, early in June, 1963, they pro-
mulgated what they called a "Property Owners' Bill of Rights."' Among
the ten "rights" so asserted were these four:
4. The right to occupy and dispose of property, without governmental
interference, in accordance with the dictates of his conscience...
* Emeritus Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Umversity; Professor of Law, Hastings
College of the Law; Reporter on Property for the American Law Institute.
'CAL. HEALTH & S. COD- §§ 35710(3), 35720; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-53.
"Realtor's Headlines, June 10, 1963, p. 2.
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6. The right to maintain what, in his opinion, are congenial surround-
ings for tenants...
8. The right to determine the acceptability and desirability of any pros-
pective buyer or tenant of his property. ..
10. The right to enjoy the freedom to accept, reject, negotiate, or not
negotiate with others.
Shortly after the Chicago meeting, Daniel F. Sheehan, Sr., of St. Louis,
President of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, speaking
in St. Louis, made it clear that these "declared rights" were intended
to assert the right of an owner or landlord to determine the acceptability
of a vendee or tenant on the basis of such person's "race, color or creed."3
No more clear-cut assertion of the superiority of "property rights" over
civil rights has been found. It acquires extra significance from the fact
that the organization headed by Mr. Sheehan includes upwards of 74,000
licensed realtors, organized into 1,455 local board.
California had discovered that its Hawkins and Unruh legislation of
1959 left much to be desired as a tool to prevent discrimination. Its area
of coverage was unclear. The inclusiveness of the phrase "all business
establishments of every kind"' lent itself to argument and distinctions.
Its teeth, consisting only of a civil action and penalty, found few persons
willing to pay the costs of an attempted enforcement. Chief Justice Gib-
son and a unanimous supreme court had tried to find significance in the
statute's language in Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., decided March 26,
1962.' The belief of Governor Brown that further legislation was needed
found expression in a 1962 article6 by Marshall Kaplan, the Report
'Realtor's Headlines, June 10, 1963, p. 1.
4 CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.
'57, Cal. 2d 463, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313 (1962) See, for example, the following
:passages from the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson:
The Legislature used the words "all" and "of every kind whatsoever" in referring
to business establishments covered by the Unruh Act (Civ. Code § 51), and the in-
clusion of these words, without any exception and without specification of particular
kinds of enterprises, leaves no doubt that the term "business establishments" was
used in the broadest sense reasonably possible.
Although the Unruh Act makes no express provision for injunctive relief, that
remedy as well as damages may be available to an aggrieved person..
For more than 50 years prior to the enactment of the Unruh Act, sections 51 and
52 of the Civil Code contained provisions prohibiting discrimination in places of
"public accommodation or amusement." The constitutionality of this legislation was
upheld in Piluso v. Spencer, 36 Cal. App. 416, 419 [172 Pac. 412] and there is no
valid reason why the extension of the prohibition against discrimnation to "all busi-
ness establishments," including those dealing with housing, would be violative of
due process. Discrimination in housing leads to lack of adequate housing for minority
groups, and inadequate housing conditions contribute to disease, crime and im-
morality.
'Kaplan, Discnmination zn Califorma Housing: The Need for Additional Legislation, 50
,CALIF. L. REv. 635 (1962)
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Coordinator of the Governor's Advisory Commission on Housing. Thus
the third current context of conflict became the Rumford Act, which was
passed by the legislature late in June, 1963. This legislation declares
that "The practice of discrimination because of race, color, religion,
national origin or ancestry. in housing accommodations [is] against
public policy";' and that this position is taken under the police power
of the State, "for the protection of the welfare, health and peace of the
people of California." 9 The statute, in terms, applies to "all publicly
assisted housing," and, perhaps, to some sixty or seventy per cent of
other housing. Mr. L. H. Wilson, president of the California Real Estate
Boards, was quoted in an article written for the New York Times by
Lawrence E. Davies"0 as having said in San Mateo: first, that the Rum-
ford Bill "had been fought every step of the way" by the California
Real Estate Association; second, that this organization did not intend to
take the statute "lying down"; and third, that the association's lawyers
were seeking to find ways in which the act could be adjudicated uncon-
stitutional, if the petition to submit it to a referendum vote failed. It is,
perhaps, fair to conclude that Mr. Wilson, speaking for the organized
realtors of California, had little affection for the Rumford Act. To a
significant extent, that act treats civil rights as qualifications on prop-
erty rights. Newspapers have stressed the activity of realtors, especially
in Los Angeles, in procuring signers to compel a referendum. Some
200,000 signatures to this end were collected, largely by realtors of the
state, but since the needed number of 292,000 was not procured by the
deadline date of September 19, there was no delay in the effective date
of the Rumford Act.
The fourth current context of conflict is found in the.,five sit-in
cases which were argued at the beginning of the current term of the
United States Supreme Court. In each of these cases one or more negroes
was convicted in state courts of "trespass," for being on the premises of
a merchant who had invited the public, except for negroes, to come on
his premises to make purchases. It will suffice to present briefly the facts
in three of these five cases. In Bell v. Maryland" twelve negro students,
on June 17, 1960, entered Hooper's Restaurant in Baltimore, and sought
to purchase food. They refused to leave after being requested to do so
and were arrested for "trespass." Their convictions were affirmed.by the
' Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1853.
'CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 35700.
CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 35700.
"N. Y. Times, July 20, 1963, p. 3, col. 1 (West. ed.)
11227 Md. 302, 176 At. 771 (1962)
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Court of Appeals of Maryland on January 9, 1962; and the Supreme
Court permitted an appeal by certiorari, granted June 10, 1963.2 In
Barr v. City of Columbia3 and its companion case, Bouie v. City of
Columbia,14 negro students sat-in in the Taylor St. Pharmacy and in
Eckerd's Drug Store. After arrest they were convicted of "entry upon
the-lands of another after notice prohibiting the same." Their convictions
were affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina on December 14,
1961, as to Barr, and February 13, 1962, as to Bouie. The Supreme
Court of the United States permitted an appeal by certiorari, granted
June 10, 1963.1' In these cases the existence of the offense charged de-
pended on whether the owner of the restaurant in Maryland, or the drug
stores in South Carolina, had a "property right" to select his customers
on the basis of the color of the customer's skin. No decision by the Su-
preme Court on these cases is likely for several months.
The fifth current context of conflict centers on the late President
Kennedy's proposed civil rights legislation as to public accommodations.
It is, of course, to the great credit of California that for half a century
prior to 1959 this state had in Civil Code §§ 51-54 a quite comprehensive
statute barring discrimination in public accommodations. No motel
operator, or movie owner, or store manager or night club proprietor
in California appears to think that his property rights are being in-
fringed by the necessity of serving negroes. This is an accepted part
of our mores. People in many parts of the country feel differently,
and the-opposition to the public accommodations part of the presently
proposed federal civil rights program is extremely keen.
Thus, in five situations of the current year property rights and civil
rights have met head on. In Berkeley and in the councils of the National
Association of Real Estate Boards property rights have been regarded
as superior. In the case of the Rumford Act civil rights have at least a
toehold on victory. In the litigations based on trespass from Maryland
and South Carolina, and in the debates concerning the public accommo-
dation provisions of the proposed federal legislation, the solution of this
conflict between property rights and civil rights is in the balance.
As we undertake our thinking together on this problem, we must keep
our perspective clear. The problem of race and property is but one
aspect of the bigger problem of the minorities, which even in our home
state reaches out into the economic questions of employment, into the
"83 Sup. Ct. 1691 (1963).
23239 S.C. 395, 123 S.E. 2d 521 (1961).
' 239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E. 2d 332 (1962)
"83 Sup. Ct. 1690 (1963).
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pervasive questions of education, and into the less tangible problems of
human dignity. I shall confine my words within my announced topic and
within the field of my life-time specialization. Thus, perhaps, I can avoid
the ineptitude of Charles Lindbergh, who having proved himself an
intrepid aviator by solo flying across the Atlantic sought acceptance as
an expert on German politics; or of Admiral Rickovdr, who haiing greai
competence in naval engineering claims credence as an inspired speaker
on problems of education. One more preliminary generality.. In the
Foreword to the posthumously published last book by Eleanor Roosevelt,
she says this:
Nothing. which happens to anyone has value unless it is a preparation.
for what lies ahead. We face the future fortified only with the lessons
we-have learned from the past. It is today that we must create the world
of the future... . In a very real sense, tomorrow is now.isa
With full awareness that the lessons of yesterday are the guideposts
for today, and that tomorrow is really now, let us proceed with our con-
siderations.
The content of the term "property right" has greatly changed in the
past two centuries."6 If one looks far enough backward it could fairly be
said that "he who owns, may do as he pleases with what he owns." Black-
stone, writing at the middle of the eighteenth century described private
property as the "sole and despotic dominion.., over the external things
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe."' 7 As Walter Lippman soundly wrote in Newsweek magazine
for September 16, 1963:
No civilized society has long tolerated the despotic theory of private
property. This conception of property is alien to the central truths of
Christendom, which have always held that property is not absolute but is
a system of rights and duties that are determined by society.
Private property is, in fact, the creation of the laws of the land.
It is a primitive, naive, and false view of private property to urge that
it is not subject to the laws which express the national purpose and the
national conscience... i8
Restrictions and freedom are two facets of the same social factor. You
must be restricted 'so that I may have liberty. Similarly, I must be re-
stricted so that you can have freedom. The task of any government worth
its salt is to keep the restrictions sufficiently strong to assure to all equal
"a ToMomlow Is Now (1963).
" Compare Ky. CoNsT. art. 13, § 3 (1850) : "The right of property is before and higher
than any constitutional sanctions; and the right of the owner of a slave to such slave, and its
increase, is the same, and as inviolable as the nght of the owner of any property whatever."
"12 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
Newsweek, Sept. 16, 1963, p. 21.
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freedoms. "Property rights," at any moment of time, represent the cur-
rent wisdom as to how this balance is best served. 9
It is, perhaps, worthy of note that we in the United States do not live
in a vacuum. We have a cherished system of American democracy, which
is under scrutiny by the rest of the world. We cannot, successfully, pull
a "Governor Wallace" on the world. Our wisdom in defining "property
rights" in 1963 will be examined and, in the parlance of law schools,
will be graded by the people of other countries, a vast majority of whom
are non-Caucasians.
20
So much of the American interposition for the modification of abso-
lute property rights is both so well entrenched and so long accepted that
we sometimes fail to recognize its full significance. Property consists
mainly of two powers: (a) the power to dispose of what is owned; and
(b) a power to use the land in question."'
The power to dispose of owned assets has been outstandingly cut down
by
(a) the Rule Against Perpetuities;"
(b) the law on unlawful restraints on alienation;2
(c) the general law barring illegal or anti-social dispositions;' -and
(d) the insistence upon formalities as prerequisities for full effi-
cacy.
2S
Beginning in the late seventeenth century, the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities took final form after a gestation period of a century and a third
as a magnificent judicially manufactured ingredient of the law designed
to curb "inconvenient" lessenings of the alienability of property and
"BENTHAM, LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE'DEFINED 84- (Eve"rett ed. 1945) -!'The, case -is that
in a society in any degree civilized, all the rights a man can have, all-the. expectation he can
entertain of enjoying anything that is said -to be his is derived solely from the law." It has
been well said- that property rights are not protected by the courts, but what the courts
protect, these constitute property rights; see znfra note 56.
"' No census of the world population on the basis of race is known to the author. The
World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1963, gives the world population as 3,060,800,000. It is
the writer's considered estimate from the data there given as to populations of. continents and
countries -that .much less than one-third of the world's population could claim to he
Caucasians.
' See Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Junstic Thought, 25 A.B.AJ. 993 (1939).
'4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 370-401 (1944); 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 911 759-90
(1962)
. 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ .404-23 (1944); 6 .POWELL, REAL PROPERTY-1111 839-48
(1958).
", 4 RESTATEMENT,: PROPERTY §§ 424-38 (1944), 6 POWELL, REAL FROPERY-4 -849-58
(1958)
' 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 1f11 879-85 (deeds), ffIT 939-60 (ivills): (t958)
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thus to curb the power of the dead hand to rule the future." It placed
outer limits of time on the power of the too often assumed all-wisdom of
present owners. Dispositions designed to take effect too far into the
future became-barred because of the recognized undesirable social con-
sequence of permitting them.
Rooted even more anciently in feudal practices, restraints upon the
alienation of present interests earned invalidity. At one time a feudal
tenant could lose his right hand, which had derogated from his overlord's
rights, by presuming to sign a deed of alienation.27 Modern thinking has
made less drastic the prohibited forms of alienation and has made milder
the penalties for overstepping established barriers; but the law as to
illegal restraints on the alienation of property bulks large as restrictions
upon what the owner of property can do with that which he believes he
owns.28
"Illegality" is broader than the restriction upon the alienability of
property. 'Whenever a proposed provision in a deed or will is judged
significantly to interfere with the long-time welfare of society, it en-
counters in our courts a stern "This you may not do"! In general such
cases involve efforts by the owner of property to use the bait of wealth
to control the conduct of his donee. 9 Such attempts have been found
illegal where the donor
(a) has attempted to control or to preclude marriage; 0
(b) has attempted to shape an exercise of the power of testamentary
disposition;-1
(c) has attempted to interfere with the religious behavior of the
recipient;"
(d) has attempted to cause departures from normal familial
relationship ;33 or
"5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY ff 762 (1962)
Cf. De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 498 (1852), where the court said: "This restraint
on alienation ... arose partly from favor to the heir, and partly from favor to the lord, and
the genius of the feudal system was originally so strong in favor of restraint upon alienatlon,
that by a general ordinance, mentioned in the book of Fiefs, the hand of him who wrote a deed
of alienation was directed to be struck off."
'See Schnebly, Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests, 44 'YALE 1.J. 961,
1186,13.80 (1935).
"6 POWVkE.L, REAL PROPERTY ff 849 (1958).
"CAL. CIV. CODE: § 710, construed strictly in Estate of Horgan, 91 Cal. App. 2d' US, 205
P. 2d 706 (1949) Cf. 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY ff 851 (1958)
'Estate of Hill, 176 Cal. 619, 169 Pac. 371 (1917), Estate of Berglanil, 180 Cal. 129,
182 Pac. 277 (1919) Cf. 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY f111 855-57 (1958)'.
',See Dra e V. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266, 118 AtI. 907 (1922)
"4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 433 (1944). See ,Girard Trust Co. v. 'Schmit;, 129N. 1.
Eq. 444, 20 A.2d 21 (1941)
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(e) has- sought to meddle with the education, or life work of the
recipient.
In all of these fields of found illegality, the criterion is the same. Is the
disposition, as attempted, anti-social in its consequences? If it is so
found, the disposition is not allowed.
The conveniences of a society depend, in part, upon proper evidences
of acts of disposition. In consequence we have developed many prereq-
uisites for effective deeds and for effective wills.3 4 These constitute a
framework within which owners of property must function if they desire
effective dispositions.
Thus the owner's power to dispose of land which he owns has become
regulated by compelling a becoming modesty in his efforts to control the
future; by barring the imposition of restraints on the alienability of
present interests; by setting limits on his use of his wealth as bait to
control the lives of his donees; and by the prescription of formalities
to be observed in acts of disposition. All of these qualifications upon the
completeness of property rights have come into our law because of an
increased recognition of society's stake in the law of property.
More important than the power to dispose of land is the power to
use it. As one looks back over the decades preceding 1963, the ever
advancing lava flow of socially originating restrictions on the individ-
ual's exercise of his "privileges of use" becomes truly impressive.
When the owner of land conveys an interior part-that is, a portion
not bordering on a highway-it is socially undesirable to permit the land
to be unusable. Hence, the conveyor is said by the courts "to have given
to his grantee" an easement by necessity for access to, and exit from, the
conveyed land. "Social welfare" negatives the otherwise existent power
of the conveyor to insist on undisturbed possession of what he has re-
tained."
When two parcels of land-let us call them Blackacre and Whiteacre
-are in the same locality, the owner of Blackacre is not permitted so to
iise his land as to lessen the reasonable enjoyment of Whiteacre by its
owner or occupier. The twelfth century assize of nuisance37 began- the
"See note 25 supra.
'More than three centuries ago, Chef Justice Glynn, in deciding Packer v. Welsted, 2
Sid. 39, 82 Eng. Rep. 1244 (1657), and finding an easement by necessity, said that it would
be to the "prejudice of the public weal, that land should lie fresh and unoccupied:' See also
San Joaqutn Valley Bank v. Dodge, 125 Cal. 77, 57 Pac. 689 (1899).
'Cf. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY IT 705 (1962). "The law of nuisance has been described
as the 'rule of give and take, live and let live.' It has to consider both the social value of
the defendant's activity and the conflicting social value of the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of
his land. Hence the utility of the defendant's conduct must be weighed against the gravity
of the plaintiff's harm.
' See McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REv.
27 (1948).
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body of law which cuts down what the owner of Blackacre can do, in
view of his duty of neighborliness. Modern equity since the year 1800
has been making constantly new applications of the basic idea that per-
sons who live in proximity to each other must so use their land as not
to injure others. The need for these narrowings of the absolute rights of
property has been steadily increased by the factor of close-living in
modem communities. Reasonableness of conduct becomes more restric-
tive as neighbors gain nearness. The otherwise existent power to make
uses of land which produce noisome odors,38 or sounds of disturbing
loudness,39 or much dust" or too bright lights"' has been kept within
limits because of the requirements of social welfare.
Water is one of the great gifts of nature. Sometimes it is m a stream,
sometimes it runs on the surface, sometimes it is to be found in under-
ground pockets or sponges, sometimes it is in the form of clouds or
enveloping mists."2 In any given area the amount and regularity of the
rainfall, the rock formations below the surface and the topographic
configuration of the surface combine to determine the total moisture
available for the nurture of the land and for uses of navigation and
business. In the arid and semi-arid states the available amount falls
far short of demand."3 In other areas the needs for water power are sel-
dom fulfilled. The supervision of the proper division of these scarcities
is a task of the law. Rules based on reasonableness" or prior use control
those inclined to be pigs for the protection of others. Considerations of
social policy fix the scope of reasonable use and also determine the rules
of prior appropriation." Land ownership does not include the power to
take or to use water to an extent or in a manner inconsistent with public
welfare.
s See, e. g., Ludlow. v. Colorado Animal By-Prod. Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943)
' See-e. g, Anderson v. Souza, 232 P.2d 274 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (operation of an
airport).
40 See, e. g., McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907)
(soot and soft coal dust)
" See, e. g., Hanson v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 61 Idaho 109, 98 P.2d 959 (1940)
(stadium lights which Indered sleep)
' Cf. DEPT. OF METEOROLOGY, THE UNIV. OF CHI., CLOUD PHYSICS AND RAINMAKING
(1957) - "More than six times as much water flows across continental United States in the air
as is carried by all the country's great rivers." See also Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v.
Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), af'd 160 Tex. 104, 327 S.W.2d 417 (1958).
' In the semi-arid area which covers approximately 400,000 square miles, there is an
annual rainfall varying from twelve to twenty-five inches. The truly and areas -of Arizona,
southeastern California, Nevada, New Mexico, southwestern Texas and Utah have an average
rainfall of less than ten inches and a ugh rate of evaporation, because of high temperatures.
"See 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 1111 713-18 (1962)
See 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY ff 734 (1962).
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A government finds its reasons for existence in the services which it
renders to the group governed.46 Hence it is not surprising to find our
courts repeatedly asserting that "property rights" are, and always have
been, held subject to the "police power";7 that is, the power of the gov-
ernment to do that for which it exists, namely, to impose restrictions
(without compensation to the owner) upon property owners, whenever
such restrictions serve the health, the safety, the morals, the conservation
of natural resources, or the general welfare of the governed group. See,
for example, the language of Chief Justice Gibson in Wilkins v. San
Bernardino,' or of Justice Shenck m the cases of Ayres v. City Council
of Los Angeles,49 and Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles." In the
latest of these three cases the opinion, concurred in by six justices,
said, ".... The very essence of the police power, as differentiated from
the power of eminent domain, is that the deprivation of individual rights
and property cannot prevent its operation, .. ." The court then quoted
from the Supreme Court of the United States, in affirming a prior Cali-
fornia opinion:
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential
powers of government, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed.
seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the
imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it
when not exerted arbitrarily. . . There must be progress, and if in its
march private interests are in the way they must yield to the good of
the community.5
"Cf. Shepard, History and Theory of Government, 7 EricYc. Soc. Sci. 8-9 (1957): "When-
ever a group of human beings actuated by common interests and desires creates an organized
institutional mechanism for the furtherance of these ends and for the adjustment and control
of their relationships, there is government. The functions of government are social con-
trol and public service."
"" See, e. g., Dube v. City of Chicago, 7 IMI. 2d 313, 131 N.E.2d 9 (1956Y, where the
court sustained an ordinance restricting noise in a manufactunng district, saying: "The con-
stitutional declarations that private property shall not be taken for public use without 'just
compensation, or without due process of law are always subordinate to the interest of the
public welfare as expressed through the exercise of the police power of the State:'
-"29 Cal. -2d '332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946) In sustaining a zoning ordinance which con-
fined complainant's property to single family dwellings, the court, in a four to three decision,
said: "Every exercise of the police power is apt to affect adversely the property interest of
somebody." :It then proceeded to hold that four multiple dwellings erected by complainant
in violation of the-oidinance could not be used as such although the trial court had found
that his use for multiple dwellings was a "substantial property right of the plaintiff."
" 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949) The court, in a five to two decision, upheld con-
ditions annexed by the planniig-authonties to the approval of a submitted subdivision plan,
over the objection of the land owner 'that these conditions took from Thm some land, for
which he-was entitled to compiensation. -
5o 40 Cal. 2d 552,254 P.2d 865 (1953)
I1 d. at 557, 254 P.2d at 867-68.
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Some aspects of the redifinition of property rights in the light of
public welfare reach back nearly six centuries. Sanitary legislation be-
gan in 1389. Commissioners of sewers were established in 14 3 0 .'
Building regulations received a large impetus from the Great Fire of
London in 1666.' The safeguarding of "health" and "safety" were the
aspects of the police power heavily stressed in the nineteenth century.
Building codes are now a commonplace in almost every community. By
1951 some 2,233 municipalities were listed as having such codes."- They
establish specifications which must be complied with by property owners
both as to the construction and use of buildings. A landowner, wishing
to have on his land a multiple dwelling or a tenement house, must con-
form to the requirements dictated by the safeguarding of health, safety
and public welfare with respect to plumbing, toilet facilities, air space
per occupant, fire hazards and ventilation. No property owner is per-
mitted to indulge his fancy for yard or porch water closets. Factories, in
proportion to the number of workers employed, have more rigorous
prerequisites, plus, in some instances, special requirements dictated by
the kind of work to be conducted therein. Mercantile structures are
similarly regulated.
Where, alas, has gone the liberty of property owners to do as they
choose with what they own? Why, if Mr. X owns Blackacre, may he not
devote Blackacre to whatever uses would be personally most profitable
to him; why may he not erect such structures as he chooses at the least
possible cost? Are not such rights part of his "property rights"? 6 Indeed
they are not, and I believe I am safe in assuming that no one today
would argue that they are. Why have his property rights become cut-
down? Because the governmental police power requires that the liberty
of a landowner be curtailed so as to assure the larger liberties of other
' 12 Rich. H, c. 13 (1389)
8 Hen. VI, c. 3 (1429).
"The ordinance for the reconstruction of London, 18 and 19 Car. II, c. 8 (1667), which
was not replaced until 1848, embodied and embellished the pre-existing rules on party walls.
=' fost cities have a building code ordinance. A survey, published in 1951 by the Hous-
ing and Finance Agency of the Division of Housing Research, reported that 2233 mumcipal-
ities had such codes. A high percentage of these codes have been modelled on some one of
four basic codes, namely (a) the Code of the National Board of Fire Underiwriters (1949),
effective in approximately 500 communities; (b) the Southern Standard Building Code
(1953), effective in over 500. communities; (c) the Code of the Pacific Coast Building Of-
ficials Conference (1949), effective in over 600 commiumties; and (d) the Code of the
Building Officials Conference of America, Inc. (1950), which was adopted in over 150 com-
munities in the four years after its publication. See also Note, 6 STAN. L. Rav. 104 (1953)
'See Hamilton and Till, Property, 12 ENcYC. Soc. Sci. 536 (1957) "It is incorrect to
say that the judiciary protected property; rather they called that property to which they
accorded protection."
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human beings. Compulsions which are the purveyors of a greater liberty
are abridgments of the completeness of property -rights made for the
promotion of social welfare.
In the field of morals there has been i similar evolution. There was
a time when profitable houses of prostitution were thought to he within
the property rights of generally respected members of the community.
This-is no longer true, Obscene exhibitions now incur remedial social
action. Open gambling - except in Nevada - is generously frowned
upon. The desirable outer limits on_-police power regulation with respect
to public morals are not yet clearly defined. The exact content of "moral-
ity," especially in the fields of gambling and sexual behavior, is subject
to dispute. The fact remains that property owners can be effectively de-
barred from any use of their property found to offend public morals and
such debarring calls for no reimbursement of the owner so debarred. 7
In the wide open spaces between Chicago and Texas there have been
comparable developments. Soil conservation districts have adopted
sometimes quite costly land use regulations which must be observed even
by unwilling owners in the district.58 Such regulations sometimes find
supplementing sanctions in the conditioning of local land loans on pre-
scribed social -behavior.9 In areas devoted to cattle raising, property
owners are" debarred from such over-grazing as Will be productive of
short-term gain, but also of long-term lessening of general welfare.
Under the Federal Taylor Grazing Act6 and the Montana Grazing Acte '
a private owner cannot procure his much needed permits to use public
lands without establishing use of his privately owned lands in a manner
preserving its long-time value. Thus "property rights" acquire redefini-
tions to assure continuing supplies of forage, called for by considerations
of public welfare. Rural zoning to preserve timber and to assure refor-
estation of denuded areas serves not only the desirable ends of conserva-
tion, but also preserves local tax revenues by returning land to; the
growing of timber -and by delaying the need for as yet insupportable
expenditures for new roads and new schools."'
"See 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY U 864 (1958). Cf. People v. Martifi, 45- Cil. 2d 755,
290 P.2d 855 (1955) (bookmaking), People v. Allen, 113 Cal. App. 2d 593, 248 P.2d 474
(1952) (bookmaking by telephone) ; People v. Renek, 105 Cal. App. 2d 277, "233 P.2d 43
(1951)- (occupying store with horse race betting paraphernalia)
"See PARKS, SOIL CONSERVATIOr DISTRICTS IN ACTION 13, 147 (1952)
"1950 Wis. L. REv. 716.
6048 Stat. 1269 (1934), 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1952), as amended, 68 Stat. 151 (1954), 43
U.S.C.A. § 315 (1959).
, MONT. REv. STAT. §§ 46-2301 to 2332 (1947)
'See State of Washington v. Dexter, 32 Wash. 2d 51, 202 P.2d 906 (1949)
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During the past half-century the evolution of the law of. zoning has
exemplified the potential scope of the police power in promoting the
welfare of the community. Largely since the Supreme Court decided
Village-of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. in 1926' it has become accepted
that the "property rights" of any land owner:
(a4 are subordinate to the establishment of residential areas in
which relaxation and relative tranquility can be enjoyed, and
in which there will be absent the vibration, noise, smoke, odors,
fumes and bustle of industry and commerce;"
(b) are subordinate to the establishment of areas devoted to the
provision of goods and services without an intermixture of
more offensive uses; S and
(c) are subordinate to the social need for controlling densities of
population so that the public services of transportation, polic-
ing, fire protection, water and power supply and waste removal
can be effectively rendered.66
In consequence most urban land owners find themselves restricted to
stipulated uses, regulated as to the fraction of the lot on which-structures
can be erected, and kept within fairly strict rules as to the heights
to which buildings can be constructed. Statutes, administrative provi-
sions and court decisions embody a pragmatic reconciliation of the
conflicting pulls of the constitutional guarantee that private property
shall not be taken without compensation and the underlying police power
of our government to serve the public welfare. 7 In this area alone prop-
erty rights have received more narrowing redefinitions in a relatively
few years than any prophet of fifty years ago could have believed pos-
sible.
Still more recent has been the effectuation of public welfare objec-
tives in the fields of planning, blight prevention and housing adequacy.
The momentous decision of Berman v. Parker,"5 stemming from the Dis-
trict of Columbia, is still less than a decade old. Only one year earlier,
272 US. 365 (1926)
MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 25.07, 25.96-.109 (3d ed. 1950).
See, e.g, Town of Marblehead v. Rosenthal, 316 Mass. 124, 55 N.E.2d 13 (1944).
Fonoroff, The Relationship of Zoning to Traffic-Generators, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
238 (1955); Kramer, Foreword to LAND PLANNING IN A DEMOCRACY, 20 LAW & CoNTEmP.
PnoB. 197 (1955); Smith, Municipal Economy and Land Use Restrictions, 20 LAw &
CoNTxmP. PaoB. 481 (1955) See also 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY ff 867 (1958)
"See note 47 supra.
"348 US. 26 (1954) In this case the taking of appellant's land and building as a part
of a "redevelopment" enterprise was upheld. The existence of the requisite "public purpose"
for an exercise of eminent domain was at issue.
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the district court in deciding the same case69 had regarded "property
rights" as an insuperable obstacle to the recognition of the demands of
public welfare.
Felix Cohen, in his essay, The Legal Conscience, published in 1960,
refers to "property" as a "function of inequality."70 There is a germ- of
truth in this which has present relevance. It is a part of the function of
government to mitigate the hardship of the less powerful members of
the community by throwing a bit of weight into the scales on the side of
those who are at a disadvantage in the balanced processes of bargaining.
Courts and legislatures have resorted to the "police power"--the general
welfare of society-in problems involving renters7' and borroWers. The
otherwise existent power of landlords to exact high rents and spend as
little as possible on upkeep has been diminished by considerations based
on social policy. The otherwise existent power of moneylenders to exact
the last pound of flesh has been trimmed by considerations of public
welfare. Deficiency judgments have been kept within rather tight limits.
I have reviewed in the past few pages some twenty aspects of the
law in which the absoluteness of property rights has been rejected be-
cause of the basic proposition that one cannot use what. he owns in a
fashion harmful to the community of which he is a part. The rule against
perpetuities, unpermitted restraints on alienation, illegal uses of the
Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp 705 (1953)
COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 41 (1960)
"In 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY hff 250-52 (1950), after tracing the legislation, state
and national, for the relief of lessees, the author says at the end of II 252:
The future of legislation in aid of the lessee population is not certain. Swings in
social philosophy may end all such legislation for a time and bring it back again at a
later date. The experience thus far accumulated should be studied as a guide for
future decisions. The age-old controversy on the relative merits of nation-wide regula-
tion versus local control is likely to continue in tis and other fields. One lesson from
the past should be observed. It is very difficult fairly to regulate the rent receipts of
lessors without simultaneously regulating the prices they must pay for maintenance
materials and maintenance labor. It is also difficult fairly to regulate rentals without
governmental participation in the financing of real estate and in supervision of the
prices at which land can be sold. These difficulties merely illustrate the Scylla and
Charybdis of society in general. License must be curbed for the protection of liberty.
Curbs gain effectiveness as they become comprehensive. There comes a time when
their effectiveness elimnnates liberty. Our struggle must be to preserve that degree
of liberty which gives the best equilibrium with curbed license.
"See 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 11f 472-73 (1952) In sustaimng the constitutionality
of a Minnesota mortgage moratorium statute, the Supreme Court in Home Building & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), said that "the economic interests of the state may
justify the exercise of its continmung and domnnant protective power notwithstanding inter-
ference with contracts." See CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. §§ 580a, b, d.
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bait of wealth to dominate the lives of other people, formalities pre-
requisite to an effective deed or will-all these define property rights
with subtractions as to the power to dispose, stemming from the preser-
vation of public welfare. When one turns to the area of permissible uses
of property, easements by necessity, the law of nuisance, the division of
the benefits of water, regulations as to sanitation and sewerage, building
codes, the maintenance of at least a minimum of morality, soil conserva-
tion, over-grazing, timber control, zoning, planning, blight prevention,
housing adequacy, and the protection of those short in bargaining power,
such as renters and borrowers, are aspects of our legal background in
which progressively property rights have been trimmed for the protec-
tion of society. In each of these twenty areas the criterion has been
basically the same. Is the claimed exercise of property rights one which
is consistent with the public welfare? If so the claim is given effect. If not
the claim is found not to be a right at all.
As early as 1945, Mr. Justice Jackson of the Supreme Court, in
stressing the subordination of private so-called rights to matters of social
concern put it thus:
Only those economic advantages are "rights" which have the law back
of them ... whether it is a property right is really the question to be
answered ....
Rights, property or otherwise, winch are absolute against all the
world are certainly rare, and water rights are not among them. What-
ever rights may be as between equals such as riparian owners, they are
not the measure of riparian rights on a navigable stream relative to the
function of the Government in improving navigation. Where these inter-
ests conflict they are not to be reconciled as between equals, but the
private interest must give way to a superior right, or perhaps it would
be more accurate to say that as against the Government, such private
interest is not a right at all.73
Thus the history of the law of private ownership has witnessed
simultaneously a playing-down of absolute rights and a playing-up of
social concern as to the use of property. Writing a few years back, Prof.
Harry Cross of the University of Washington at Seattle wrote of the
"diminishing fee."'74 His title was descriptive of what has been narrated
thus far, and prophetic of what is still ahead. Property rights have been
redefined in response to a swelling demand that ownership be responsi-
ble and responsive to the needs of the social whole. Property rights
cannot be used as a shibboleth to cloak conduct which adversely affects
United States v. Willdw River -Power Co., .324,US..499 '(19451
"20 LAw & CoNiIP'. PnoB. 517 (1955)"
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the health, the safety, the morals, or the welfare of others.
Let us turn the light of this history upon the soundness of the Prop-
erty Owners' Bill of Rights promulgated by the National Association of
Real Estate Boards to strengthen the backbones of owners, renters and
realtors in discrimination; upon the legality of the provisions in the
Rumford Act; upon the propriety of convicting of trespass negroes
who sat-in at a public restaurant in Baltimore, Md., or sought to be
served food at public drug stores in Columbia, S. C.; upon the law-
fulness of the proposed public accommodation provisions in the civil
rights legislation now under consideration by Congress. The criterion is
a simple one. Is it contrary to public welfare to permit an owner of
property to reject a vendee or lessee solely because of the color of his
skin? Is it contrary to public welfare to permit the operator of a store,
to which the public is invited, to qualify his invitation by the addition
"except negroes"? To the extent that such conduct is contrary to the
public welfare, then the history reviewed here shows us that there
is no property right to be asserted for the defeat of these civil rights.
So we are remitted to a basic question of fact. To what extent, if at
all, is it contrary to "public welfare" to sanction discrimination based
on (in the words of the Rumford Act): "race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry."75 If it is contrary to public welfare, the National As-
sociation of Real Estate Boards is living amidst the trappings of a past
era. If it is contrary to public welfare, the Rumford Act, so far as it
goes, is a move in the right direction. If it is contrary to public welfare,
the Supreme Court should reverse the trespass convictions of Bell, Barr
and Bouie. If it is contrary to public welfare, the public accommodations
provisions of the proposed federal act embodies that which is already
law.
76
It is difficult for a white person fully to realize the hurt to human
dignity, the deep feeling of injustice, the souring of the milk of human
kindness, the establishment of the foundations of bitter hatred caused
to a negro when he find that his money is not acceptable in the purchase
of a home or in the rental of housing, or when he finds himself excluded
from a restaurant, or a motel, or a hotel, or a drug store open to serve
other human beings." It is true that only about ten per cent of our
national population are negroes. Is the white majority in this country
u Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 1853.
"In an address to the State Bar of California, during the Fall of 1963, Justice Tobriner
of the Supreme Court of California suggested that our courts already have power .to enforce
rules which our legislators are hesitating to put into statutdry form.
"The novels of James Baldwin make clear this inner hurt to a negro.
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willing to blink at the racial hostilities generated by continued adherence
to its inherited prejudices?"8 Deep seated resentments in a substantial
fraction of our populace are too likely to prove costly both as to the
safety and the welfare of the rest of the country. If one were told by his
doctor that 10% - maybe 17 pounds - of his body was infected with
cancer, would he retain his poise and feel assured that there was no
danger to the health or welfare of the balance of his body?
This question rises above partisan lines. It is true that President
Kennedy in his message to Congress said "No property owner who holds
his property for the purpose of serving at a profit the American public
at large, can claim any inherent right to exclude a part of that public
on grounds of race or color." It is also true that the Republican platform
of 1960 in dealing with "equality under law" said: "It becomes a
reality only when all persons have equal opportunity, without distinction
of race, religion, color or national origin, to acquire the essentials of
life - housing, education and employment." As long ago as 1910, a not
wholly forgotten Republican, Theodore Roosevelt, expressed the idea
basic to this article when he said, "Every man holds his property subject
to the general right of the community to regulate its use to whatever
degree the public welfare may require it."79
Even if one could develop sufficient calluses so as to feel not at all the
upset of his 15,000,000 brothers, the problem would not be solved. In
an age of jet planes and nuclear fission these United States do not live
apart. The world is smaller than it was fifty, or forty, or thirty or
twenty or even ten years ago. The validity of American democracy, the
truth or hypocrisy of its protestations of belief in justice and in the
fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of all humans is up for judgment
at the bar of world opinion. That tribunal is no longer stacked in favor
of the white man. The Caucasians of the world are vastly outnumbered
both by members of the yellow race and by members of the black race.
Is it not contrary to both the "safety" and "general welfare" of white
Americans to continue practices of discrimination within our borders
which hurt the self-respect of untold millions around the world, and
which furnish to our ideological enemies the strongest arguments as to
our sincerity?
SIt might be argued that there is, perhaps, another ten per cent of our national popula-
tion who will become more hostile than they are now to negroes, if segregation ceases. If we
are forced to choose between incurring further hostility of prejudiced whites, or incurring
the further hostility of demanding blacks by denying them equal rights in our supposed
democracy, can anyone doubt which choice is inevitable under the elemental principles of
justice or in accordance with the teachings of any of the religions professed by our citizens?
19 Osawatomie speech, Aug. 31, 1910, 19 T. RoosEvELT, WORKS, MEMorAL EnrrioN 24.
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Unless someone is able to show that continued discrimination based
on color does not threaten the safety and public welfare of this fair
land, the so called Property Owners' Bill of Rights promulgated by the
National Association of Real Estate Boards in so far as it has relevance
on this topic should be rejected; the Rumford Act should be accepted,
conformed to and applied with remedial liberality; the trespass cases
should be reversed by the Supreme Court on the basic proposition that
property rights provide no cloak for the denial of civil rights, and the
public accommodation clauses of the federal civil rights legislation
should be speedily enacted and rigorously enforced.
Property rights cease when civil rights involving the public welfare
are at stake.
